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Abstract 
In this article, we analyse an instance of revitalisation of a dormant interregional organisation dating back to the 
Cold War: the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), initially launched by South 
American and African states in 1986 through the UN General Assembly. Drawing on the concepts of “consensual 
hegemony” and “contested multilateralism” we argue that the current phase of ZOPACAS’ existence is 
characterised by Brazil's efforts to rekindle it, thus reflecting its aspiration to create a new space of influence. Rather 
than pursuing more traditional forms of regional leadership, Brazil uses ZOPACAS as part of a persuasion-based 
strategy based on regional multilateralism that is designed in antagonism to other international organisations and 
Western powers. However, this strategy also faces important limitations resulting from resource constraints, lack of 
institutionalisation and an excessive exclusionary focus on minimising the role of global powers with interests in the 
region. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2007, around 150 government representatives from South American and African states along the South Atlantic 
met in the Angolan capital of Luanda to discuss security and development issues pertinent to the region. Nominally, 
the event marked the sixth summit of the Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), an 
initiative originally launched in 1986 through the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In practice, however, 
the reunion represented the first attempt to revitalize what was a dormant product from the Cold War: a trans-
regional initiative created exclusively by and for developing countries. The local and global contexts had changed 
considerably between the 1986 inauguration and the Luanda meeting twenty-one years later. By the time that certain 
South Atlantic states, rallied by Brazil, decided to reboot the organization, the Soviet Union and Apartheid South 
Africa had collapsed, the unipolar moment of the United States (US) had started to decline, and--save for the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) military presence in the Falklands/Malvinas--nuclear submarines from superpowers no longer 
patrolled the region. What, then, brought Brazil to invest in the revitalization of an organization that seemed to have 
lost its raison d’être in the post-Cold War period? And what have been the primary motivations behind this 
revitalization effort? 
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ZOPACAS is an intriguing example not only because of the time gap between its initial launch and current 
revival efforts, but also because the organization comprises an exclusively "Southern" initiative on all accounts: both 
geographically and membership-wise, as it is proposed by, composed of, and dedicated to countries that identify 
themselves with the Global South. Given the customary role of global powers in the creation and leadership of most 
international organizations spanning over more than one region, ZOPACAS prompts new questions about the logic 
of Southern institutions and the opportunities that have emerged for them in the post-Cold War system. Under what 
conditions or for what purposes do rising powers engage with such organizations? Providing a study of ZOPACAS 
contributes to a better understanding of the institutionalization of South-South Cooperation in general, and of 
Brazil’s approach to expanding its role in the global order in particular. 
We find that, in the case of ZOPACAS, the current revitalization process involves a large number of 
developing countries whose interests partially overlap, but whose regional and international ambitions also diverge 
on important points. In its attempt to claim the South Atlantic economic and security space, ZOPACAS has acquired 
certain traits of an international organization, such as United Nations (UN) recognition and periodic ministerial 
meetings. However, ZOPACAS lacks a number of characteristics typically associated with international 
organizations, such as a budget, headquarters, a secretary-general, and institutional symbols. As a consequence, 
ZOPACAS lacks consistency: it easily slips into oblivion but can also easily be resurrected. 
Analyzing the rekindling of ZOPACAS, we argue that Brazil's spearheading of this initiative has been 
driven by both inclusionary and exclusionary aspirations, but that ultimately the effort is more geared at dividing the 
Atlantic into North and South than at integrating the Western and Eastern shores of the South Atlantic. More 
specifically, under the Workers Party-led government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), and to some extent 
under his successor Dilma Rousseff (2011-present), Brazilian political elites have become more averse to the 
possibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its members playing an expanded role in the 
South Atlantic (Helbig 2013; Smith-Windsor 2015). To this end, Brazil has tried to mobilize other states along the 
region in an effort to make the South Atlantic an area of predominantly South-South cooperation, in which Western 
powers ought to play a secondary role. The South Atlantic has thus become an extension of what Burges (2008; 
2015) has identified as Brazil's "consensual hegemony" approach to attaining leadership in South America: a 
strategy based on persuasion that seeks to minimize the appearance of overtly hegemonic ambitions within the 
region.  
 ZOPACAS thus represents a relevant case to further develop the conceptualization of Brazilian’s foreign 
policy, as it constitutes an effort to expand the strategy of consensual hegemony towards the South Atlantic and 
Africa. ZOPACAS further embodies the limits of this strategy beyond the region Brazil has successfully delineated 
as its neighbourhood. First, the construction of a vague, potential "intruder" in the region is a negative integration 
factor rather than the fulcrum of a positive agenda, Such a feature may have played an important role in the post-
Cold War regionalisms in South America but can be easily questioned in the current global context. Indeed, the 
heavily exclusionary focus of ZOPACAS, rather than a stress on cooperation among its members, may hamper more 
robust region-building across the South Atlantic. Second, although regular meetings have been reinstated and its 
agenda has been broadened, ZOPACAS still suffers from significant hurdles in consolidating itself as a credible, 
effective organization. In particular, doubts remain regarding whether ZOPACAS members have enough 
commitment and capacity - including the ability to foster a shared "South Atlantic" identity - to advance a robust 
transregional agenda. Again, the involvement of the member states is much more volatile than in the established 
Brazilian neighbourhood. Third and more broadly, the case of ZOPACAS prompts the question of whether Southern 
international organizations can become effective actors imbued with collective agency when they primarily figure as 
instruments of rising power ambitions. ZOPACAS therefore has to be contextualized among new coalitions with 
nascent institutions, such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil, and 
South Africa). 
 The article draws on an array of primary sources, including original interviews with policy-makers in 
Brasília, Windhoek and Luanda as well as declarations and resolutions stemming from ministerial meetings and 
member states. The following section provides a brief overview of how the international relations literature has dealt 
with Global South institutions. We then look more specifically at the role of rising powers, focusing first on the case 
of Brazil and, second, on its interests within the South Atlantic. After that, we analyze three elements of ZOPACAS: 
its original conception and launch during the late Cold War; Brazil's role in its revitalization; and the key limitations 
stemming from its partial institutionalization. The conclusion acknowledges the repercussions of our findings for the 
study of international organizations in the South, while pointing out how the concept of consensual hegemony could 
be expanded.  
 3 
 
2. Rising Powers and the Global South 
2.1. International Organizations and the Global South 
Although the term "Global South"--much like the concepts of the "Third World" or the "Developing World,"—has 
been questioned due to fuzziness and normative connotations (see, for instance, Escobar 1995), the countries and 
societies typically included in this category generally share two conditions: a shared colonial history and low socio-
economic indicators. Despite formal self-determination, their relationship with the former colonial centers has been 
characterized by persistent inequity, and their integration into the international system has taken place according to 
rules and institutions largely drawn up by the global powers that once colonized those territories (Esteva 2010; e.g. 
Stone 2011). In addition, their populations face high indices of social and economic exclusion (Deacon 1997), even 
though conditions vary widely even within the Global South. Over the past decade, some developing countries, such 
as Brazil and South Africa, have experienced a significant improvement along some key indicators, even though the 
gains are very unevenly distributed within their territories and population. Despite these gains, those states continue 
to routinely identify themselves with the Global South, especially when advocating for a more representative global 
governance system. 
These traits help to explain why international organizations that are initiated and led by the Global South 
tend to be reformist: they generally resist or at least question the historical patterns of North-South dominance that 
have marked different areas of international relations (Braveboy-Wagner 2009). Many countries have been active in 
launching formal initiatives in the spirit of a Global South. Some of these initiatives emerge as ad hoc coalitions. 
The G7+, for instance, was launched in 2010 by seven so-called fragile or conflict-affected states in order to foster 
state-building and development by advocating reforms in the international community's current approaches to 
conflict-affected countries. Other initiatives have turned into international organizations, most notably the Non-
Alignment Movement as well as numerous regional organizations such as the African Union or the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations. Participation in these organizations tends to reinforce countries’ self-identification as 
members of the Global South, with relations between them (commonly denoted "South-South relations") presented 
as an alternative or complementary path of insertion to the global system.  
 
2.2. Brazil as a Rising Power: Regional Aspirations 
Within the post-Cold War context, certain developing countries have been identified by international relations 
scholars (and occasionally identified themselves) as rising powers: states that are able to draw on economic and 
ideational resources to exert influence in a self-defined region and that aspire to greater influence in the current 
global governance system, both individually and through coalitions (Hurrell 2006; Kahler 2013). A burgeoning 
literature has emerged over the past decade about the roles of these countries in the global order (e.g. Hart and Jones 
2011; Narlikar 2010). However, categories such as "rising power" or "emerging power" have also been criticized for 
their lack of specificity and their unidirectionality, particularly since in recent years some of these countries have 
experienced a significant economic slowdown. Despite oscillations in economic power, many key decision-makers 
in these countries perceive a gradual international transition towards multipolarity that would allow them to play a 
more important role in the existing configuration of global governance. As a result, the notion that there are new 
windows of opportunity for engagement with regional and global issues has emboldened some of these states to 
become more active in pushing for reforms of international organizations. Part of this strategy has been the 
promotion of counterweights, by either launching or strengthening Global South organizations, including informal 
coalitions such as the BRICS and IBSA.  
Within their neighborhood, some rising powers are taking up new region-building strategies, i.e. efforts 
meant to forge regional identities and organizations in ways that help to advance their material interests and to shape 
norms-setting processes (Neumann 1994). Whereas in some instances, regional organizations may emerge in a 
relatively decentralized manner (Acharya 2013), in other contexts rising powers take it upon themselves to lead the 
efforts, benefitting from existing power asymmetries between them and other states in the region. India, for instance, 
has led efforts to boost the Indian Ocean Rim Association. As with the creation of any social group, region-building 
by rising powers entails both inclusion - in the sense of strengthening ties among members and granting membership 
according to a set of criteria - and exclusion, in the form of leaving out certain actors that may otherwise be 
interested in participating yet who are perceived as rivals. Through exclusion and inclusion, such organizations help 
to redefine regions so as to favor the position of rising powers within those specific spaces.  
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 Brazil is often mentioned within the international relations literature as a rising power, and its foreign 
policy-makers sometimes consciously use the label. Taking advantage of a growing domestic market, vast natural 
resources and a large young population, Brazil experienced a period of relatively high economic growth in the 
2000s. Domestically, this enabled some poverty and inequality reduction, while externally, this growth emboldened 
the country's foreign policy, which began attributing unprecedented importance to relations with other developing 
countries. 
During Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s presidency, South-South relations, including with Africa, ranked among 
the top priorities of Brazilian foreign policy. In some respects, this strategy built upon steps taken by his 
predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso: strategic linkages with the post-Apartheid South Africa; provision of 
troops to peacekeeping operations, especially in Angola; and helping to launch the Community of Portuguese 
Speaking Countries (Saraiva 1997).1 Under Lula, however, the strategy of expanding relations with other developing 
countries was part of a broader effort to increase Brazil's autonomy on the international arena. While some have 
interpreted the focus on South-South relations as occurring at the expense o Brazil's ties to the advanced economies, 
others (Pecequilo 2010) have argued that there was in fact a strengthening of Brazil-US ties during Lula's 
presidency. With respect to Africa, the Lula government intensified and diversified Brazil's ties across the continent, 
both bilaterally and through rising power coalitions such as the IBSA Dialogue Forum and the BRICS coalition, 
while distancing itself from the Western powers. Through new informal platforms, Brazil has called for a more 
representative global governance architecture--one in which it would also have more maneuvering space for itself. 
However, the degree to which these emerging institutions have been able to institutionalize themselves has varied 
widely; IBSA has suffered from wavering political commitment and scarce financial resources, while the BRICS 
grouping has sought to create a more long-term role by launching new structures with specific mandates, such as the 
New Development Bank (NDB) (Abdenur and Folly 2015). 
 The centerpiece of foreign policy during the Lula government, however, was not Africa-specific: rather, it 
entailed the reinvigoration of Brazil's long-time aspiration to become a permanent seat holder at the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) (Vargas 2012). Expanding the country's South-South ties became strategically important as a way 
to broaden the support that Brazil enjoyed in the UNGA for its UNSC bid, as well as to secure key leadership 
positions of other established multilateral organizations. However, these global ambitions required considerable 
regional clout. In order to achieve such leadership, Brazil collaborated with other left-wing governments in the 
region to keep the US at bay while founding new exclusive South American institutions. Most prominently, Brazil 
led efforts to launch the Community of South American Nations in 2008, which turned into the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR). In the area of security, UNASUR has created the South American Defense Council 
to facilitate regional military coordination. In certain domains these new arrangements directly compete with the 
Organization of American States (OAS), of which the US is still an influential member (Weiffen et al 2013). 
These moves can be interpreted as attempts by Brazil to ascertain a degree of consensual hegemony in 
South America. In Burges' (2008) interpretation, Brazil's regional ambitions in the sub-continent are not readily 
explained by the mainstream neo-realist focus on hegemony. Instead, he argues that Brazil has worked to gain 
strength through a "non-domineering hegemony" that relies on consent rather than explicit coercion or the threat 
thereof: 
"The imperative was not to subsume other regional states to Brazilian will, but instead to cycle the region-
forming process through Brazil and position the country’s propositions and prerogatives as the central 
unifying factor of a potential South American region." (2008, 75). 
Despite increased contestation to such an approach in its regional diplomacy (Malamud 2011; Burges 
2015), Brazil applies pressure and launches initiatives, often through multilateral channels, to structure 
neighborhood relations and regional organizations in a way that benefits Brazil's interests, without posing as an 
aggressive neighbor. However, such institutional proactivity is also often accompanied by hesitancy in assuming the 
bulk of the associated costs. Far from an innovation of the Workers Party-led government, this indirect and 
consensual approach is a strong aspect of traditional Brazilian diplomacy dating back to at least the Cold War, even 
if consensual hegemony is not a conscious strategy per se. Rather, this particular dynamic is inferred and has 
developed incrementally over time, as Brazil tries to balance its regional leadership aspirations against external and 
                                                
1 The bulk of these efforts were largely based on the initial outreach carried out under Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart’s Independent 
Foreign Policy line between 1961 and 1964. Afterwards, Brazilian officials maintained steady economic interests towards such regional 
heavyweights as Nigeria and Angola.  
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domestic constraints. These have included rivalries within the region as well as oscillating growth and persistent 
socio-economic challenges such as elevated levels of poverty, social inequality, and crime, which limit the resources 
that the government can allocate to international efforts. 
 
2.3. The South Atlantic: A Brazilian Ocean? 
Although consensual hegemony has been understood within the Brazilian context in terms of the country’s 
ambitions in South America, the concept may be extrapolated to another geopolitical space that has acquired new 
significance in both Brazilian foreign and defense policies: the South Atlantic. Historically, Brazilian foreign and 
defense policies have focused on its landmass and terrestrial borders, with the Amazon and the River Plate Basin 
featuring as key points of security concern. However, Brazilian military circles, especially the Navy, have long 
nurtured ambitions of enhanced naval power in the South Atlantic. As far back as 1978, Brazilian decision-makers 
began debating the idea of developing a nuclear-powered submarine to patrol its waters (Martins Filho 2011).  
Yet it was not until the mid-2000s that the South Atlantic was granted a level of strategic importance in 
Brazil's foreign and defense policies. On the political side, this shift was largely a result of the Lula's government 
desire to strengthen ties with African countries. On the defense side, the 2007 discovery of large reserves of oil and 
gas in the pre-salt layers off the Brazilian coast and deeper within the South Atlantic reinvigorated interest in 
Brazil’s maritime spaces. The Navy launched a public awareness campaign, entitled "Blue Amazon," that seeks to 
draw parallels between Brazil's legal waters - rich in resources, vast, and hence difficult to patrol - with the "green" 
Amazon, thus mobilizing popular support for the new initiatives in the South Atlantic (da Silva 2013). These efforts 
have included not only stepping up plans to expand Brazil's legal waters under the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) but also a naval upgrading program encompassing the acquisition of vessels and equipment as well 
as the development, in collaboration with France, of the long-coveted nuclear-powered attack submarine. 
In addition to expanding its naval power, Brazil has worked to deepen its diplomatic ties to African states 
along the South Atlantic. This strategy entails not only the traditional channels of diplomacy, namely the Ministry of 
External Relations (also known as Itamaraty) and the Presidency, but also the Armed Forces, with the Navy in 
particular playing an important role in establishing bilateral cooperation initiatives including officer and cadet 
training, provision of vessels and equipment, and assistance with continental shelf mapping (Seabra 2014).2 
Concurrently, certain military and civilian circles in Brazil have grown more concerned with the prospect of US- 
and NATO-led interventions in the South Atlantic (e.g. Antunes 2010). The resolve to keep great powers from 
“meddling” in the region has reemerged in political discourse as Brazil's increased economic and political profile 
encouraged bolder claims of leadership within the South Atlantic. 
Accordingly, Brazil sought to rally African countries behind its own vision for the South Atlantic. 
Benefiting from an international commodities boom, it invested significantly in new multilateral arrangements such 
as IBSA and the Africa-South America (ASA) Summits. From the viewpoint of Brazilian decision-makers, these 
intergovernmental alliances could potentially broaden support for Brazil’s growing assertiveness in the Global 
South. Nevertheless, the wider geographic membership of those coalitions did not lend itself to an exclusive focus 
on the South Atlantic. As a Brazilian diplomat puts it, in the context of “construction and rediscovery of the 
mechanisms of cooperation with African countries, ZOPACAS emerged as something that already existed and that 
was worth investing in and developing further”.3 More striking in this approach is the fact that resurrecting dormant 
organizations can be deemed an uncommon strategy among emerging powers. Generally, aspiring hegemons tend to 
create new organizations that are tailored to their envisaged sphere of influence and that may question existing 
frameworks. In the Brazilian case, that was achieved with the formation of UNASUR in the face the OAS.4  
However, at the time of Brazil’s reengagement with the South Atlantic the objectless ZOPACAS happened 
to match Brazil’s vision for the region. Not only did ZOPACAS offer an alternative, conveniently loose framework 
for reshaping regional dynamics, it also implied a Southern exclusivity that, when coupled with distrust of Northern 
actors, matched the prevalent Brazilian discourse of a South Atlantic free of external interference. As former 
                                                
2 Brazil has also worked to vastly expand the international legal definition of its territorial waters by filing a proposal with UNCLOS, based on 
surveys of its own continental shelf (da Silva 2013).  
3 Interview #1 with Brazilian diplomat, Brasília, June 2013. 
4 Similar attempts can be observed with China’s promotion of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or Russia’s push for the Eurasian 
Economic Union, both initiatives creating tensions with existing institutions. 
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Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota stated in 2013, Brazil’s overall concerns towards NATO remained, namely the 
search for “partnerships outside of its defensive area, way beyond the North Atlantic, including in regions of peace, 
democracy, social inclusion and which do not admit in its territory arms of mass destruction” (Patriota 2013b). 
The discursive appropriation of South Atlantic dynamics suggests that Brazil's consensual hegemony 
approach has expanded beyond its land-based neighborhood, i.e. South America. This does not necessarily warrants 
the employment of significant material resources towards the fulfillment of such geographic interest. But it does 
account for another attempt to obtain global recognition as a successful aggregating leader on the regional domain in 
a bid for further international relevance. In this case, however, clear steps have also been taken to exclude actors 
perceived as external, namely Western global powers. Transforming the South Atlantic into a mare brasiliensis thus 
entails two simultaneous strategies: on the one hand, pulling African actors into the fold of a potential South Atlantic 
identity while, on the other, ensuring that competing actors such as NATO or the US are viewed as intrusive and that 
their influence within the region is minimized. 
  
3. ZOPACAS: A Global South Organization 
3.1. The South Atlantic and ZOPACAS: A break from the Cold War 
During most of the Cold War, the South Atlantic represented a marginal space in global geopolitics for the great 
powers. Early efforts to structure relations in this space yielded few results, as they lacked necessary support by all 
invested parts. In the 1960s, for instance, Brazilian and Portuguese officials discussed a common political-security 
arrangement, but the initiative never took off due to the difficulties of conciliating such project with the remaining 
Portuguese colonies in Africa. In the 1970s, South Africa proved equally unsuccessful in convincing the US and 
South American countries to support the idea of bringing the Indian and South Atlantic oceans under an anti-
communist “Southern Cross Alliance” (Kelly and Child 1988; Leysens 1992). The idea of creating a defense 
organization in the South Atlantic continued to circulate between Argentina, South Africa, and Uruguay, who 
advocated the creation of the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation, mirroring the aims of NATO (Hurrell 1983). 
Brazil, however, remained skeptical due to conflicting views between Itamaraty and the Armed Forces on how to 
best engage Apartheid-ruled South Africa (Penna Filho, 2013; Saraiva 1997). The latter’s international pariah status 
also prevented full participation by African countries and by the democratizing South American states. Finally, the 
1982 war between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas dashed aspirations of a Western-
friendly South Atlantic. 
Following these non-starters, a new form of cooperation between adjacent countries of the South Atlantic 
emerged in 1986 in the form of ZOPACAS. Founded by all states bordering the South Atlantic--with the exception 
of South Africa, then-occupied Namibia, and countries with overseas territories in the region--ZOPACAS essentially 
aimed to establish the South Atlantic as a demilitarized space free of foreign military bases, internal aggression, and 
weapons of mass destruction. The Apartheid regime was explicitly mentioned as both aggressor and threat to the 
security of the region while implicitly, the memory of Operation Argus - three atmospheric nuclear bomb tests held 
in the South Atlantic by the US in the 1950s - fueled additional concerns. The secondary purpose of ZOPACAS 
during this period was to promote development cooperation among member states in the economic, environmental, 
and social domains.5 
ZOPACAS thus represented a shift away from previous attempts to structure relations within the South 
Atlantic. Instead of adapting to a bipolar world order, its underlying rationale was to autonomously change the 
power structure within the South Atlantic. The voting pattern at the UN General Assembly underscored the Global 
South scope of this project. While the overwhelming majority of 124 states approved the proposal, the US rejected 
it; and the eight abstainers were mostly former colonial powers and NATO members6. Like other Global South 
organizations of its time, ZOPACAS brought together a large number of hitherto disconnected states through shared 
rejection of imperial and colonial dominance.  
However, notwithstanding the joint initiative at the UN, different individual motives substantiated Brazil, 
Argentina, and African countries’ participation. For its chief promoter, Brazil, ZOPACAS constituted an important 
geopolitical instrument. By helping to devise a multilateral guarantor of a peaceful South Atlantic, Brazil primarily 
                                                
5 A/RES/41/11 of 27 October 1986 
6 The abstainers were Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and West Germany. 
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sought to institutionalize its ascendance over the discussion of any other possible collective projects in the region. At 
the same time, its deepening relations with Africa stood to benefit from a structured framework that professed the 
exclusion of Apartheid South Africa as well as European powers with a nearby military presence (Saraiva 1997). In 
addition, ZOPACAS embodied a far-reaching normative agenda to which many of the member countries already 
subscribed. The emphasis on non-militarization and non-proliferation traits effectively disguised Brazil’s 
shortcomings in terms of the military capabilities needed to assume any kind of overall responsibility for the 
protection and security of this area. Argentina, on the other hand, backed ZOPACAS because the initiative provided 
support for its foreign policy priority, the Falklands/Malvinas. As the country reviewed its adherence to the West 
(Tulchin 1987), ZOPACAS provided a space to promote Argentina’s foreign interests. It gave the country the 
opportunity to escape the bipolar system, to build up relations with new allies in the Global South, and to gather 
support in claiming sovereignty over the Falklands/Malvinas.   
For most African members, though, ZOPACAS was an important step towards both overcoming Apartheid 
and achieving the independence of Namibia, since the institutionalization of relations with states across the South 
Atlantic reinforced the isolation of the South African government. ZOPACAS thus complemented organizations 
with an anti-colonial dimension, such as the Frontline States and the Non-Alignment Movement, providing them 
with additional legitimacy through its official origins within the United Nations. To the rulers of young African 
states, maintaining a zone free of nuclear weapons would also help stabilize their status quo in the face of frequent 
internal political instability (Khanyile 2003). A non-securitized South Atlantic might curb hegemonic expansions 
and relieve African states from having to build up their own naval forces. 
Despite the widespread support for the forum at its early stages, ZOPACAS did not have a leading country 
that could garner undisputed support from all members (Lechini 2007). More importantly, in the 1990s, these 
countries’ priorities began to shift. The relevance of anti-colonialism declined following the independence of 
Namibia and the democratic transition in South Africa while the insertion into the global economic system trumped 
South-South solidarity. Hence, much as occurred with other organizations of the Global South during that period, 
new objectives were included in an attempt to prolong the existence of ZOPACAS. For instance, it started to 
consider assistance to African democratic transitions by providing instruments to support human rights, multiparty 
systems, and racial equality. In addition, environmental issues and organized crime emerged as important policy 
fields.7 The new thematic areas were also the results of a changing context. As both the Cold War and the Apartheid 
regime came to an end, many countries started acknowledging that some of the original premises behind ZOPACAS 
had become outdated. Proliferation fears, for instance, had already been reduced after 1994, when all participating 
countries officially declared the South Atlantic a zone free of nuclear weapons.8 On the other hand, defense and 
security had also gradually lost their regional centrality as such issues were relegated to the fold of bilateral 
relations, particularly among countries with relevant navies. Finally, despite a series of high-level meetings in Rio de 
Janeiro (1988), Abuja (1990), Brasília (1994), and Somerset (1996), the non-binding nature of ZOPACAS 
declarations and action plans--coupled with its irregular calendar of activities--translated itself into a decreasing 
level of commitment from member states. Heterogeneity among these states, as well as the lack of interest in 
maritime security and economy, kept ZOPACAS at a very low level of interaction.  
After the 1998 meeting in Buenos Aires, ZOPACAS’ relevance further decreased, as it entered a near 
decade-long hibernation. This retraction can be attributed to three factors. First, an acute lack of logistical capacity 
prevented Benin from organizing the next gathering, as it had pledged during the 1994 Brasília meeting, under 
different economic and political expectations.9 Secondly, the emergence of new regionalisms on both sides of the 
South Atlantic provided alternative multilateral mechanisms to deal with common issues of interest (Mattheis 2015). 
The Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), for example, began to take precedence 
for their members, which preferred to invest more heavily in such structures rather than in ZOPACAS. The 
negotiations between MERCOSUR and the Southern African Customs Union towards a preferential trade agreement 
illustrate this trend. Thirdly, ZOPACAS’ dormancy also reflected the disengagement by Latin American countries 
from their African counterparts. By the turn of the century, Argentina and Brazil, in particular, faced severe 
economic crises that significantly limited their range of action abroad (Lechini 2007). Under these circumstances, 
                                                
7 See, for example, the Declaration on the Marine Environment adopted at the third meeting in Brasília. A/49/467, Annex III of 4 October 1994 
8 A/49/467, Annex II of 4 October 1994 
9 A/49/467, 31 of 4 October 1994 
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ZOPACAS‘ resolve weakened as member states became less willing to spend time and resources in resuming its 
activities. 
 
3.2. The revitalization of ZOPACAS: from Luanda to Montevideo 
After years of inertia, ZOPACAS surfaced again in 2006, when the final declaration of the first ASA summit 
referenced the former’s contribution to regional cooperation on peace and security (ASA 2006, 6). Such timely 
acknowledgement of both the forum’s existence and raison d’être hinted at its potential appeal, at a time when both 
regions were starting to reconnect. Harnessing this general interest, Angola spearheaded a series of low-key 
meetings between mid-level officials, the first of which took place in New York in March 2007, focusing on the 
original themes of ZOPACAS: economic cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation. A second workshop was held a 
month later in Montevideo and dealt with combating and preventing crime, peacekeeping operations, and illicit trade 
in small arms and light weapons. Finally, in May, a third workshop was held in Buenos Aires, with maritime issues 
high on the agenda, including the sustainable use of maritime genetic resources, and fighting illegal fishing. The 
cumulative results of these meetings provided enough common ground to then convene the Ministerial Meeting in 
Luanda in June 2007. 
The meeting succeeded in achieving its primary goal: to secure the transfer of the responsibilities for 
managing ZOPACAS’ affairs to Uruguay. But more importantly, the meeting’s proceedings were also a testament to 
a new global context. In both the final declaration and the plan of action, ZOPACAS was now willing to tackle a 
broad array of pressing international issues, ranging from climate change negotiations to the Millennium 
Development Goals and global economic governance. Meanwhile, nuclear non-proliferation and regional security 
retained their centrality within the ZOPACAS agenda.10 This thematic variety reflected the growing assertiveness of 
the Global South, and it helped ZOPACAS to position itself within increasingly vocal calls for more adequate 
representation and participation in global decision-making. ZOPACAS’ broadened agenda also elevated its standing 
vis-à-vis competing regional projects.  
Despite such favorable prospects, Brazil chose to play a secondary role during the initial stages of the 
revitalization—Brazil’s growing South Atlantic interests and its longstanding preference for multiple multilateral 
initiatives notwithstanding. Unlike most African countries, the Brazilian delegation to Luanda was not led by a 
cabinet member but rather by a diplomat, signaling the country’s cautious engagement. Further reinforcing this 
perception, at the subsequent 61st UN General Assembly, held in September 2007, Brazil did not express its support 
for the ZOPACAS resolution submitted by Angola on the basis of the recent meeting, as it had previously done 
since 1986.11 Brazil’s positioning seemed to call into question its previous commitment to provide ZOPACAS with 
a central role at the UN.  
How to explain such non-committal behavior at the early stages of this process? An analysis of the 
developments within Brazil’s policy-making indicates two reasons. First, Brazil indeed sought to break the formal 
deadlock of ZOPACAS’ untransferred presidencies, but it was unwilling to fully commit itself to an unknown result 
without first ascertaining whether the conditions were ripe. In other words, “it suited Brazil that Angola assumed the 
presidency” so that it could test the waters of African interest without compromising recent gains in terms of 
Brazilian public profile, won across the continent during the first years of Lula da Silva’s government.12 Given that 
investing resources and political capital in an irregular platform entails certain risks, Brazil initially sought to tread 
carefully, evaluating the chances of renewed activities only after the Luanda meeting. Secondly, in 2007, Brazil was 
still in the process of redefining its interests in the South Atlantic. Foreign policy overtures towards Africa had 
already taken place, but Brazil’s defense agenda was still being revised. Recurrent changes at the helm of the 
Defense Ministry and the protracted process behind the country’s first National Defense Strategy added to the 
uncertainty and help to explain Brazil’s initial detachment from ZOPACAS’ revitalization. 
Despite this ambivalent start, as Brazil reconceptualized the South Atlantic, ZOPACAS’ perceived 
usefulness increased accordingly. Its singular geographic delineation fitted into Brazil’s discourse for the region, 
which presupposed excluding actors and policies that did not match ZOPACAS’ rationale of non-proliferation and 
                                                
10 A/61/1019, Annex 1 of 7 August 2007 
11 A/61/PV.107 of 13 September 2007 
12 Interview #2 with Angolan diplomat, Luanda, June 2014. 
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peaceful resolution of conflicts. As a Brazilian diplomat explained, supporting ZOPACAS’ revival and 
consolidation comprised in itself “a message to the outside”, namely that “there are certain ways of doing things, we 
[Brazil] don’t want for our region. [...] There are tendencies to expand ranges of action, which most of the times do 
not correspond to what we consider best and more constructive for the [South Atlantic] region”.13 Accordingly, 
ZOPACAS’ revitalization acquired strategic importance for Brazilian national defense, following the publication of 
Brazil’s first Defense White Book (Brazil, Ministry of Defense 2012, 35-36). In turn, this formal acknowledgment 
required Brazil to participate more actively and more publicly in the initiative’s activities.  
Recognizing the need to foster activities in-between ministerial meetings, Brazil offered to organize a two-
day conceptual roundtable in Brasilia in December 2010. Together with representatives of the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime, the International Seabed Authority, and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, 
member countries agreed on the need for an exchange of best practices and for capacity-building in the areas of 
mapping and exploring the seabed, as well as for strengthened cooperation in the environmental area and on aerial 
and maritime transportation. 
However, as it had happened before, ZOPACAS soon faced practical hurdles due to Uruguay’s logistical 
difficulties in organizing the 2011 meeting. Subsequently, the next Ministerial Meeting took place only in January 
2013, in Montevideo, frustrating expectations of greater regularity. Yet even these drawbacks did not temper 
ambitions for ZOPACAS as its agenda continued to expand.14 Taking advantage of the work previously done in 
Brasília, a new plan of action was issued, providing a new framework for cooperation activities and closer contacts 
at the UNGA. Finally, the initiative’s collective stance on security questions regarding the sovereignty of the 
Falklands/Malvinas, international drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, and armed strife in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo underscored ZOPACAS’ aspiration to generate common positions on issues of conflict and peace.15 
Recognizing that the Luanda agenda had not yet been accomplished, members embarked on a second revitalization 
effort that sought to increase the profile of ZOPACAS within a context of competing multilateral frameworks. 
Ultimately, “it’s a question of awareness. (…) The more frequency, the more meetings are made aware, we are 
going to have a lot interest from Africa, especially because they will benefit from capacity building, they will benefit 
from environmental protection and so on”.16 This time, however, Brazil was willing to commit to the process, 
raising expectations over its leadership. 
Considering the difficulties of organizing multi-regional meetings involving representatives from 24 
countries, the Brazilian Air Force dispatched an airplane to Africa to make sure delegations from smaller African 
countries made it to Uruguay. Additionally, Brazil made its diplomatic network in Africa available to Uruguayan 
authorities to help in preparatory contacts with each participating member. And for the first time ever, both Brazil’s 
External Relations and Defense Ministers took part in the work proceedings of the Montevideo meeting, showcasing 
the relevance of ZOPACAS for the country’s foreign and defense policy circles. Two central ideas were then 
conveyed as precursors for greater Brazilian engagement. First, common South Atlantic interests were emphasized 
as the basis for closer cooperation, but only if they “have visibility before the entire world” (Patriota 2013a). In other 
words, Brazil wanted increased external recognition of those dynamics. Secondly, ZOPACAS’ institutional 
development was elevated to a matter of national interest for every member country by highlighting commons 
threats as well as unwanted outside alternatives. In the words of then-Defense Minister Celso Amorim: “If we don’t 
take charge of peace and security in the South Atlantic, others will. And they will not do it the way that we want: 
with the vision of a developing country that rejects any colonial or neo-colonial behavior” (Amorim 2013a, 2). 
Seeking to match words with deeds, Brazilian authorities announced in Montevideo that the Brazilian 
Cooperation Agency would offer 122 openings in training initiatives on the areas identified by the Montevideo 
Action Plan, for officials from every ZOPACAS country. Later in 2013 a workshop on maritime search and rescue 
was also held in Brazil, with the country assuming the leading role and covering the full costs of each member’s 
participation. The emphasis remained on how these initiatives could function as precautionary measures, given that 
“the more we cooperate, the lesser space we will leave for undue foreign interference” (Amorim 2013b, 2). 
                                                
13 Interview #3 with Brazilian diplomat, Brasília, June 2013. 
14 Further evidence of such thematic expansion can be found in the topics covered by the declarations. If by 1999 in Buenos Aires the final 
declaration included 23 points, in Luanda that number expanded to 80 and afterwards, in Montevideo, to 124. 
15 A/67/746, Annex 1 of 19 February 2013 
16 Interview #4 with Namibian diplomat, Windhoek, June 2014. 
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3.3. The limits of ZOPACAS 
Since its creation, ZOPACAS has struggled to position itself amidst multilateral organizations with which it 
thematically and geographically overlaps. Originally framed around a UNGA resolution, it managed to attract the 
interest of its members precisely due to its loose format and minimal institutionalization. ZOPACAS thus did not 
develop centralized headquarters or a secretary-general position that could personify the organization. The entire 
formal structure has remained intergovernmental and largely dependent on the commitment of the responsible 
national ministries. ZOPACAS archives, for instance, need to be handed over each time a presidency is transferred 
to another country. Non-state actors, in comparison, play a very secondary role in ZOPACAS. Civil society and 
especially businesses are mentioned as potentially involved parties (UNGA 2013), but a regular consultation process 
has not been established. 
The only modicum of resident structure can be found in the so-called Permanent Committee adjoined to the 
UNGA, designed to foster continuous dialogue between member states by taking advantage of each country’s 
diplomatic missions to the UN. Led by current and former chairs, as well as the chair of the subsequent ministerial 
meeting, it functions as the sole follow-up guarantor to ZOPACAS activities. Ultimately, the Committee is 
responsible for making informal contacts at the margins of the UNGA yearly sessions, reviewing progress over the 
different initiatives, submitting annual UNGA resolutions, and requesting other UN bodies to routinely assist in the 
implementation of the various action plans. The UN system is thus uniquely central to ZOPACAS’ existence and to 
its continuing relevance within the international system. 
Decision-making, however, continues to be exerted primarily through the ministerial meetings. By rotating 
the hosting of each meeting, ZOPACAS strives to promote a shared sense of inclusiveness and parity between its 
members. Yet this can also hamper the advancement of the regional agenda, as the organization depends heavily on 
a single member state for the success of working proceedings. Many members are small countries with very limited 
budget and personnel for such events, and the hosting of a ZOPACAS meeting does not necessarily occupy a top 
priority amidst regular foreign policy commitments. As past occasions have shown, the capacity to regularly 
organize, attend, and follow-up such meetings faces severe constraints. 
Despite these institutional limitations, ZOPACAS constitutes a working platform for members to lobby for 
their interests, and final declarations reflect each country’s national priorities. Moreover, the prolonged and 
sometimes irregular standby periods turn ZOPACAS into a significant arena for launching ad hoc initiatives. In 
practice, ZOPACAS can be conceived as an effective ground for recruiting allies for initiatives related to the South 
Atlantic or to ZOPACAS’ stake in global governance institutions. The issue of whaling illustrates this dynamic. 
After Latin American states agreed on a common position on whale watching and a moratorium on commercial 
whaling in the International Whaling Commission, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay turned to ZOPACAS to gain 
support from other member states for their proposal to establish a whale sanctuary in the South Atlantic (Bailey 
2012).  
Nevertheless, given ZOPACAS’ lack of institutionalization and the limited capacity of many members to 
deal with pressing maritime security challenges, occasional policy convergences do not suffice to forestall the 
presence of other external actors in the region. The US, the UK, France and other NATO members maintain a 
military presence and continue to act as providers of regional security against such issues as drug trafficking or 
piracy. Conversely, ZOPACAS contends to hold a degree of regional legitimacy, while embodying the role of a 
discursive gatekeeper that can judge over which external actions are acceptable or even desirable in the South 
Atlantic. Still, the organization lacks the capacity to monopolize the maritime space and is unable to provide 
exclusive South Atlantic solutions to problems that invariably call for external solutions. The case of exercises 
conducted by extra-regional navies in this maritime space constitutes a case in point.  
Above all, ZOPACAS underpins its intentions of establishing an international regime in the South Atlantic 
with a clear antipode in mind: a “Global NATO” assuming responsibility for security in the Global South (cf. 
Daalder and Goldgeier 2006). ZOPACAS aspires to make the rejection of nuclear weapons, the peaceful resolution 
of conflicts, and self-governance by the South into norms, but these remain ambitions, and ZOPACAS’ functional 
and geostrategic priorities shift on an ad hoc basis according to the impulses of key actors. Most members use 
ZOPACAS to simultaneously enhance their sovereignty vis-à-vis external powers and internal threats. But for Brazil 
in particular, the forum serves as an instrument to expand regional leadership, to delineate a renewed transregional 
space, and to balance NATO and the US.  
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Even though Brazil has been favorable to maintaining ZOPACAS’ loose framework, the ambition to 
revitalize ZOPACAS as a relevant regional actor for global governance requires a steady commitment that faces two 
important caveats. First, Brazil’s lack of material means to single-handedly alter the region’s security context poses 
hurdles to its intended regional authority, since the discourse it promotes is sometimes unmatched by its actual 
capacity. As challenges on African shores increase--from trafficking routes through Guinea-Bissau to piracy spikes 
in the surrounding Gulf--Brazil will be expected to play a heftier part and to commit further resources to joint 
efforts. Inability to do so may undermine any semblance of unity behind Brazilian aspirations towards ZOPACAS. 
Secondly, the bulk of the costs associated with such a wide agenda need to be assumed by its chief 
proponent. Although Brazil’s financial commitments to ZOAPCAS increased in a post-Montevideo meeting context, 
its limits are also apparent. In late 2014, for instance, Brazil was expected to organize a second ZOPACAS seminar 
on peacekeeping operations but had to scrap it due to new budgetary pressures and shifting political priorities. As 
internal economic increase, any consistent ambitions in this regard may become ultimately compromised. Hence, 
there is a risk of ZOPACAS becoming too dependent on Brazil’s fluctuating economic cycles and internal political 
willingness to bankroll such initiatives. Brazilian decision-makers must thus manage expectations over the country’s 
role in ZOPACAS’ progressive development. 
 
4. Reflections about international organizations of the Global South 
 
 
 ZOPACAS illustrates how rising powers can resort to organizations of the Global South so as to contest 
existing forms of multilateralism that are perceived as Northern-dominated. In this regard, Brazil has been involved 
in reshaping governance structures in its neighborhood by creating new organizations, thus trying to discredit 
existing arrangements in which it feels overpowered. Other rising powers, such as South Africa and Nigeria, engage 
in similar behavior, which can be partly explained by the concept of contested multilateralism (Morse and Keohane 
2014), i.e. shifting issues to different arenas after dissatisfaction over the rules and missions in existing international 
organizations. However, our analysis points to particularities concerning the approach of emerging powers. Firstly, 
actors do not necessarily shift from one organization to another. They can also contest multilateral structures to 
which they do not formally belong. Indeed, the Global South actors behind the creation and revitalization of 
ZOPACAS do not contest NATO’s existence. Rather, they aim to fill a gap in terms of security in the South Atlantic 
before other organizations step in, including NATO itself. Secondly, contestation is not limited to the rules or 
missions of an organization but can also entail a strong focus on membership. If we conceive ZOPACAS in 
opposition to NATO as a Western-based organization, the most striking feature is the lack of any overlaps. 
ZOPACAS clearly defines itself over who is not a member, and it looks unlikely to incorporate states from the 
North, no matter how tangible the territorial, military, or economic presence of the UK or the U.S. in the South 
Atlantic might be. Despite its lack of institutionalization, the revival of ZOPACAS thus provides an important 
indicator of how the rising power Brazil intends to project its leadership and how it defines the next frontier between 
potential allies and contestants. 
ZOPACAS also serves a two-folded purpose for Brazil’s consensual hegemonic aspiration in the South 
Atlantic: it excludes competing security providers and includes actors that can provide legitimacy. It thereby follows 
a similar logic as contested multilateralism within South America: MERCOSUR helped to prevent the US-led Free 
Trade Area of the Americas while UNASUR is presented as an alternative to the OAS. Both contenders excluded 
the biggest rivals of Brazil in the hemisphere--the US and Mexico--from security governance and infrastructure 
projects in South America. Likewise, the resurrection of ZOPACAS reflects a fault line in the Atlantic between the 
North and the South. Even though ZOPACAS lacks the resources to become an effective security provider, 
Brazilian authorities conceive it as a fitting delineation of the maritime space in which Brazil feels confident enough 
to exercise influence. Consensual hegemony is therefore not only applicable to the established neighborhood of 
regional powers structured around landmasses but also to areas hitherto largely outside of their reach, in this case the 
South Atlantic. 
Inasmuch as the concept of consensual hegemony should bring more attention to how rising powers stretch 
the territorial and regional borders of their influence, its limitations also merit consideration. In a revision of his 
original take, Burges points out the temporality inherent in the concept, as any “credibility [previously] won 
eventually wanes if not matched with concrete leadership goods provision” (Burges 2015, 204). While consensual 
hegemony pursuit might easily fit Brazil’s multiple region-formation aims, its chances of success will depend on the 
capacity to deliver on the expectations it has helped to raise among its South Atlantic partners. Such a constellation 
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differs from its role within BRICS, where any type of hegemony would be difficult to achieve. Conversely, further 
institutionalization of BRICS such as the establishment of alternative global financial institutions does not primarily 
depend on Brazil’s involvement.  
 The case of ZOPACAS further illustrates two particular characteristics of interregional organizations 
confined to the Global South. The first characteristic is socio-economic. In most organizations, member states often 
lack the necessary means to ensure that agendas are effectively implemented. Even when resources are available, the 
priority is to privilege multilateral or regional memberships that are either of vital necessity, yield significant returns 
or have a penalty mechanism. Global South organizations in general, and ZOPACAS in particular, fail to rank 
favorably on these criteria. Budget and dedicated personnel are very limited, which constrains the credibility of its 
declarations. Various regional organizations in Africa and Latin America have compensated by resorting to external 
financial sources, such as European foreign aid. However, this path can lead to donor dependency and undermines 
the legitimacy of such an undertaking. Since ZOPACAS was created and revived in a spirit of opposition to the 
involvement of external actors it is difficult to envisage the inclusion of donors for the purpose of rent-seeking. 
The second characteristic concerns the shared experience of colonialism and its impact on the interpretation 
of sovereignty as national sovereignty. Most ZOPACAS member states are extremely reluctant to transfer power to 
any kind of permanent structure, especially in matters of security. Hence, non-interference is not only upheld as a 
norm to exclude foreign powers but also as a basic rule inside the region. This stance yields resistance to 
supranational institutionalization and centralized power-sharing. Instead of delegating competencies to or pooling 
authority in a permanent secretariat, decision-making and implementation are confined to interactions between 
national ministries. In this sense, the institutionalization of ZOPACAS reinforces the paradigm of national 
sovereignty but severely limits the creation of South Atlantic sovereignty. 
Regardless, ZOPACAS shows that it is possible to cut across established continental regions and attempt to 
redefine a maritime space as a region in its own right. The organization’s main aggregating trait can be found in its 
claim to oversee a demarcated space while minimizing the relevance of outside actors. However, the difficulties in 
creating a shared identity are evident. The idea of a common adversary is a very powerful mortar and can certainly 
constitute the foundation for an integration process that sustains itself even after the perceived threat vanishes. Yet, 
for all purposes, a South Atlantic identity is still missing in ZOPACAS, thus demonstrating that the exclusive 
element still dominates over the inclusive dimension. 
Despite its current limitations, ZOPACAS’ resurgence in the present international context exemplifies the 
emergence of new opportunities for multilateralism within the Global South. If Southern regional powers become 
actively involved, the international organizations they promote are likely to coincide with their self-perceived 
regional spaces, where their influence can be exerted and ideational gains can be reaped. However, in order to fully 
carve out an ocean of the Global South, the other members of ZOPACAS will also have to decide whether or not to 
accept Brazilian as their consensual hegemon. Until other countries are able to appropriate and conceptualize the 
South Atlantic as their ocean, and until Brazil matches its leadership aspirations with the corresponding political and 
financial commitments, common solutions will not only remain fragile, they will also continue to be designed by 
those who are both able and willing to afford the support of their peers. 
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